By
Max Siollun
We
all know that Nigeria’s first military coup took place on January 15
1966. However the actions and motivation of the principal actors has
been the subject of misintepretation over the years. In this article
(the first of a two part series), my intention is to accurately describe
the sequence of the events that guided and led to that tragic event,
and to correct some of the misconceptions about that coup. This article
is part one of a two article series on the coup. Part two will follow
in a few weeks time. A special branch “police report” on the coup was
commissioned by Maj-Gen Ironsi. The report was compiled by Lt-Col
Yakubu Gowon, Captain Baba Usman of Military Intelligence and Alhaji
Yusuf. Copies of this report were leaked and although the report is
extremely detailed, it contains errors in some places.
The
coup was so complex that one needs to understand the political
situation at the time to appreciate the reasons for the coup. After
Nigeria gained independence from the UK, its domestic politics TRIED to
emulate those of its former colonial master by adopting a Westminster
style parliamentary democracy. There the similarities ended. Instead
of the cultured debate and sophisticated party political culture of the
UK, Nigeria’s politics fragmented on regional and ethnic lines. Due to
the splitting of the country into three geo-political regions, party
politics (and political parties) took on the identity and ideology of
each of the three regions. The northern region was represented by the
Northern People’s Congress (NPC) whose motto of “one north, one people”
gave a realistic and accurate assessment of its objectives. Southerners
viewed the NPC as the party of the Hausa-Fulani. The western region’s
dominant party was the Yoruba led Action Group (AG) and the east’s the
National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) which was controlled by the
Igbos. These regional based parties assured two things: firstly that
none of the parties could govern Nigeria on its own, and secondly that
ethnic conflict was only a matter of time away.
The
NPC took control of the Federal Government with the NCNC as the junior
partner in a shaky coalition (the NPC’s deputy head Tafewa Balewa became
the Prime Minister and the NCNC’s leader Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe took the
ceremonial role of President). The AG led the opposition. The make up
of the Government was odd. The NPC’s leader Sir Ahmadu Bello could
have become Prime Minister but chose to instead become leader of the
northern region, and handed over the Prime Minister’s chair to his
deputy Tafewa Balewa. Rightly or wrongly, many southern politicians
viewed Balewa as Bello’s puppet and resented the fact that (in their
opinion) the government was being ruled by proxy by a regional ruler and
viewed Bello as the real power beyond the throne. This may have led
southern politicians to have a disrespectful attitude toward Balewa.
This perception was not helped when Bello referred to Balewa as “my
lieutenant in Lagos”.
At
independence the northern region was given more seats in parliament
that the two southern regions put together. This meant that no
meaningful governmental decision affecting Nigeria could be taken
without the consent of the north. Southern rulers belatedly began to
appreciate that northern politicians were not as naïve as they thought
and that the lopsided parliament meant that the north would politically
control Nigeria forever. The only way to alter the north’s control of
the country was via a constitutional amendment (unlikely since the north
controlled the parliament )….or violence. The conviction and
imprisonment of the AG leader and western region premier Chief Obafemi
Awolowo for treason seemed to suggest that some southerners had chosen
the latter option. In a controversial trial Awolowo was convicted of
hatching a plot to overthrow the government by force of arms. Awolowo’s
incarceration was followed by the installation an unpopular government
led by Chief Samuel Akintola of the NNDP. The NNDP has very close links
to the ruling NPC and was regarded by many as a local western “branch”
of the NPC. Akintola was elected as premier of the western region in a
bitterly controversial election that was widely regarded as massively
rigged. Popular resentment against the NNDP spilled over into wide
scale violence, protests arson and murders that placed many parts of the
western region into a state of near anarchy which earned the region the
nickname of the “wild west”. The Ibadan based 4th battalion of the army (commanded by Lt-Col Abogo Largema) was deployed to restore order. Most of the soldiers in the 4th
battalion were of northern origin and the battalion itself was
perceived as being pro-NPC and highly politicised. One of the officers
who carried out the January coup accused Lt-Col Largema of giving
training to Akintola in the use of firearms. If this allegation is
true, then getting firearms training was probably a wise move on the
part of Akintola given how many enemies he had.
The
NPC government decided to authorise a massive security crackdown to
curb the lawlessness in the west. To carry out the crackdown, the
government first had to reshuffle the upper echelons of the security
establishment. The Inspector-General of police Louis Edet was sent on
leave and replaced by Kam Salem. The army’s General Officer Commanding:
Major-General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi was also to be sent on indefinite
leave and replaced by Brigadier Maimalari. These reshuffles (by fault
or design) would result in the replacement of two eastern officers (both
of whom may have been suspected of having NCNC sympathies) from the
NCNC power base of the east by northerners. Additionally the corruption
of certain government ministers drew public condemnation. The
ostentatious lifestyle of government ministers such as Chief Festus
Okotie-Eboh raised eyebrows to say the least.
It
became clear that a violent conflict was inevitable. Despairing at the
lack of political of a political horizon, many openly began to call for
the army to intervene to break the political deadlock. The army
responded in deadly fashion. A group of radical army officers had
decided that the only means of breaking the political logjam in the
country was to execute a coup d’etat to overthrow the government. Their
plan was to overthrow the government, release opposition leader Obafemi
Awolowo from prison and install him as the Prime Minister.
There
were rumblings of possible military coup as early as 1964. Then
President Azikiwe (in his position of commander in chief of the
country’s armed forces) had openly called on the army to intervene to
break the political deadlock in the country after Azikiwe refused to
call Balewa to form a new government following scandalous elections that
were marred by massive rigging, thuggery, intimidation and murder. The
heads of the army, navy and air force all met with Azikiwe and made it
clear that they would not intervene. Azikiwe also obtained legal advice
from the Attorney-General which indicated that the service chiefs were
right to disobey his call to intervene. Azikiwe therefore eventually
called on Balewa to form a new government after the nation tottered
perilously in uncertainty. In 1964 some of the same group of soldiers
that eventually carried out the 1966 military coup had planned to take
advantage by using the distraction of a senior officers’ course to stage
a coup. However the plan was cancelled when rumours of the plot
leaked.
THE WAY THINGS WERE
The table below shows the rank and background of the Nigerian army’s high command as at January 14 1966.
NAME
|
POSITION
|
BACKGROUND
|
Major-General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi
|
GOC – Nigerian Army
|
East: Igbo
|
Commodore Joseph Wey
|
Commanding Officer – Nigerian Navy
|
Mixed Yoruba/eastern minority heritage
|
Brigadier Samuel Ademulegun
|
CO – 2nd Brigade – Kaduna
|
West: Yoruba
|
Brigadier Zakariya Maimalari
|
CO – 1st Brigade – Lagos
|
North: Kanuri
|
Brigadier Babafemi Ogundipe
|
Nigerian military attaché in London
|
West: Yoruba
|
Colonel Thimming
|
CO – Nigerian Air Force
|
German expatriate officer
|
Brigadier Varma
|
CO – Nigerian Military Training College – Kaduna
|
Indian expatriate officer
|
Colonel Kur Mohammed
|
(Acting) Chief of Staff at Army HQ – Lagos (in place of Colonel Robert Adebayo)
|
North: Kanuri
|
Colonel Ralph Shodeinde
|
Deputy-Commander, Nigerian Military Training College: Kaduna
|
West: Yoruba
|
Colonel Robert Adeyinka Adebayo
|
Attending a course in London
|
West: Yoruba
|
Lt-Colonel Yakubu Gowon
|
Preparing to take over command of the 2nd battalion from Hilary Njoku
|
North: Angas
|
Lt-Colonel Francis Fajuyi
(was on leave in his home town of Abeokuta during the coup)
|
CO – 1st Battalion - Enugu
|
West: Yoruba
|
Lt-Colonel Hilary Njoku
|
CO – 2nd Battalion – Lagos
|
East: Igbo
|
Lt-Colonel George Kurubo
|
CO – 3rd Battalion – Kaduna
|
East: Rivers
|
Lt-Colonel Abogo Largema
|
CO – 4th Battalion – Ibadan
|
North: Kanuri
|
Lt-Colonel Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu
|
CO – 5th Battalion – Kano
|
East: Igbo
|
Lt-Colonel James Pam
|
Adjutant-General of the Nigerian Army
|
North: Birom (his father was the Chief of Jos and his brother was in the air force)
|
Lt-Colonel Arthur Unegbe
|
Quartermaster-General of the Nigerian Army
|
Mid-West: Igbo
|
Lt-Colonel Ime Imo
|
CO – Lagos Garrison
|
East: Igbo
|
Major Hassan Usman Katsina
|
CO – 2nd Reconnaissance squadron - Kaduna
|
North: Fulani
|
Major John Obienu
|
CO – 1st Reconnaissance squadron – Abeokuta
|
East: Igbo
|
Those whose names are italicised in the above table were killed in the coup of January 1966. May their souls rest in peace.
Before
indigenous soldiers took control of Nigeria's army, the four most
senior officers of Nigerian origin were Brigadiers Johnson
Aguiyi-Ironsi, Samuel Ademulegun, Babafemi Ogundipe, and Zakariya
Maimalari (in that order). When it was announced that the British
soldiers would soon depart, it became obvious that the veteran trio of
Ironsi, Ademulegun, and Ogundipe were favourites to land the job of GOC.
Ironsi was the most decorated of the three. A tall and physically imposing man – he looked like
a soldier (a stark contrast to the pot bellied Generals of later
generations) yet was easy going and spoke in a slow, measured tone. His
father was from Sierra Leone and his mother an Igbo. He had been the
premier soldier of his generation and was considered good enough to
command a United Nations peacekeeping force (the first African to do so)
in the Congo – twice. While Ironsi was in the Congo, he took on the
rank of Major-General, but reverted to Brigadier when he returned to
Nigeria. During the Congo peacekeeping mission, Ironsi sent Maimalari
(who was then two ranks below him) home to Nigeria after a disagreement
over military tactics. The words of retired Maj-Gen Ike Nwachukwu (then a
second lieutenant) give an indication of Ironsi’s stature at the time.
Nwachukwu said that the first time he saw Ironsi "it was like seeing a
God....he was the God of all us soldiers". To gauge the integrity of
army officers back then, Ironsi had debts of 18,500 Naira (after almost
twenty five years of service), having risen to the rank of
Major-General, having commanded a UN peacekeeping force, and having
become Head of State with access to the nation’s treasury.
Brigadier
Maimalari was a notoriously fiery disciplinarian who "would brook no
insubordination". For this reason, he "exacted unqualified discipline
from all his subordinates" (See Gbulie: "Nigeria’s Five Majors"). He
was widely respect in the army and was tipped to become a future GOC.
Like his military colleagues from the north: Colonels Mohammed, Pam and
Largema, he was an alumni of the famous Government College in Zaria.
Brigadier
Ademulegun was another sticker for discipline, and was the most
controversial of the Brigadiers. While acknowledged as "a first class
soldier" (see Gbulie) he was personally unpopular in the army –
especially among junior officers. His open friendship with the Sardauna
of Sokoto won him few friends in the military and accepting a gift from
the Sardauna (a horse) irritated many junior officers (who ignored the
fact that Ademulegun was not really in a position to refuse gifts from
the most powerful politician in the land). Ironically, Ademulegun felt
that his political links would land him the job of GOC. For this reason,
he may have been a little overconfident about his chances of securing
the job. Thus when he did not get the job, he became jealous of the new
GOC and was not shy about pointing out the inadequacies of the man
picked in preference to him.
Brigadier
Ogundipe’s personality was more sedate than those of Brigadiers
Ademulegun and Maimalari. When recommending his successor, the
departing British GOC, Major-General Welby-Everard said that Maimalari
"was younger and considerably more junior to the others (Ironsi,
Ademulegun, Ogundipe) and I also considered him to be militarily
immature. He never entered seriously into my considerations". Everard
went on to recommend (without success) Brigadier Ogundipe as his
successor. Everard regarded Ogundipe as "A very capable and efficient
officer…Unlike Ademulegun he was very popular within the Army and
greatly respected both as a senior officer and as a man. He was also
noticeably non-political" (the quotes of Maj-Gen Welby-Everard are
reproduced in Chuks Iloegbunam’s "Ironside"). The Federal Government
ignored the advice of its GOC and gave the top job to Ironsi.
“THESE BOOKISH PEOPLE”
The ideological circle
of for the January coup seems to have consisted primarily of officers
who had embarked upon military careers after completing university
degrees. The late former military governor of the Northern Region:
Hassan Katsina once commented on the presence of some “bookish people”
who had joined the Army for rather different reasons from the normal
military crowd. Katsina was probably referring to the graduates that
had begun to join the Army. These graduates may have been exposed to
the left wing political doctrine which was sweeping across much of
Africa, Asia, and South America at the time. In January 1966, the
Nigerian Army had six graduates: Lt-Cols ‘Emeka’ Ojukwu and Victor
Banjo, and Majors Olufemi Olutoye, Adewale Ademoyega, Emmanuel Ifeajuna,
and Oluwole Rotimi. Three or four of these graduates were involved
conceptually, or physically in the January coup. Of the direct
participants, Ademoyega had a degree in History from the University of
London, and Ifeajuna was a graduate of the University of Ibadan.
Although
not physically involved in the January coup, Lt-Colonels Ojukwu and
Banjo had been accused of showing a greater than average interest in
political matters. Ironsi also noticed the increasing political
sophistication of his men and moaned “I asked for soldiers and am being
given politicians dressed in uniform”. Security reports concerning coup
plotting by Banjo were passed to Prime Minister Balewa, who ignored
them. Major Ademoyega claims that the Majors had at some point in
time, floated the idea of a coup to Ojukwu and Banjo, and also to
Lt-Colonels Hilary Njoku and Francis Fajuyi. The four Lt-Colonels were
not opposed to a military coup, but Njoku and Ojukwu were “unsure” about
whether to participate (see Ademoyega: “Why We Struck”). None
of the four Lt-Colonels got physically involved when the Majors
eventually struck and three (Njoku, Ojukwu, Fajuyi) actually played a
role (to varying degrees) in crushing the coup, while Fajuyi and Ojukwu
became military governors in Ironsi’s military administration. Many
northern soldiers suspected Fajuyi of at the very least being
sympathetic to the Majors’ coup, and at worst to have assisted them in
the planning of the coup. Katsina once referred to Fajuyi as an “Action
Grouper” in sarcastic reference to Fajuyi’s perceived support for the
AG.
A MAN CALLED KADUNA
Major
Patrick Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu was a promising, charismatic and
slightly rebellious officer that worked as the Chief Instructor at the
Nigerian Military Training College in Kaduna (the city of his birth).
Nzeogwu was a devout catholic, a teetotaler, a non-smoker, and despite
being a bachelor, did not spend much time chasing women like many young
men of his age. Yet he was prepared to kill civilians in a military
coup that he believed to be just. His charisma was such that even his
detractors were prepared to admit that he was “an incorruptible idealist
without ambitions of power….in many ways a man born before his time”
(see Muffet : “Let Truth Be Told”).
Some
claim that Nzeogwu’s participation in the January 1966 coup was part of
a grand Igbo agenda to “dominate” the country. This argument
overlooks the fact that Nzeogwu was an Igbo in name only. Nzeogwu was
born in the Northern region’s capital of Kaduna to Igbo immigrant
parents from the Mid-West Region. Such was his family’s affinity to the
city of Nzeogwu’s birth that they and his military colleagues called
him “Kaduna”. When not in his army uniform he wore northern mufti and
frequently referred to himself as “a northerner”. Nzeogwu spoke fluent
Hausa (the lingua franca of the Northern Region) “like a native”
(Forsyth). In fact Nzeogwu’s command of Hausa was better than his
command of Igbo. It is a mark of Nzeogwu’s popularity that when his
body was discovered during the Nigerian civil war by federal soldiers,
they took his body away for burial with full military honours (but not
before his eyes had been plucked out). Although one account claims that
a northern soldier swore at the minister that performed Nzeogwu’s
burial ceremony (see Luckham: The Nigerian Military). So what
possessed a puritanical, bible bashing, innocent young man like Nzeogwu
to murder the nation’s most powerful northern politician in the middle
of the night? Nzeogwu’s reasoning is chilling in its simplicity: “We
wanted to get rid of rotten and corrupt ministers, political parties,
trades unions and the whole clumsy apparatus of the federal
system. We wanted to gun down all the bigwigs on our way. This was the
only way. We could not afford to let them live if this was to work.
We got some but not all. General Ironsi was to have been shot, but we
were not ruthless enough. As a result he and the other compromisers
were able to supplant us”.
What
is clear is that Nzeogwu had harboured some anti-government sentiment
for several years before 1966. Nzeogwu’s boss at the Nigerian Military
Training College: Colonel Ralph Shodeinde, had in the past reported
Nzeogwu to Army Headquarters for allegedly disseminating anti-government
rhetoric to junior officers. Shodeinde’s report claimed that Nzeogwu
had been attempting to poison junior officers’ minds against the
Government (see Obasanjo: “An intimate portrait of Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu”).
Nzeogwu was so disillusioned with the farcical vote rigging that he
exclaimed “it is impossible to vote out a Nigerian minister”.
Nzeogwu
was recruited into the conspiratorial group by the fellow Sandhurst
trained Major Chris Anuforo. Nzeogwu in turn tried to recruit others
into the plot. Nigeria’s former Defence Secretary: Lt-Gen Theophilus
Danjuma was aware of Nzeogwu’s coup recruitment policy. As a former
colleague of Nzeogwu, Danjuma noted that “Nzeogwu was a very charming
person. He had his method, he would start by criticizing government and
then watch your reaction…..if you joined him in criticising the
government…..then he would say well, we would (sic) fix them one
day. That’s how he recruited”. Major Tim Onwuatuegwu bought Nzeogwu’s
anti-government line. Onwuatuegwu was an Igbo from Nnewi and a
colleague of Major Nzeogwu at the Nigerian Military Training College,
where Onwuatuegwu was also an instructor. Onwuatuegwu was tagged a
dull, parade ground “goody two shoes” type by one his own course-mates
at Sandhurst but fell under Nzeogwu’s spell and was convinced enough to
break into the house of, and shoot his own Brigade commander during the
coup.
One
officer that seems to have been unaffected by Nzeogwu’s political
rhetoric was a cadet named Salihu Ibrahim. Ibrahim was training at the
Nigerian Military Training College while Nzeogwu (chief instructor at
the College) and company hatched the coup plot. Despite being close to
Nzeogwu, Ibrahim matured into a “vintage professional soldier” (Chris Alli: The Siege Of a Nation)
who abhorred military participation in Government. Ibrahim retired
from the Nigerian Army in 1993 after rising to the rank of Lt-General,
and serving as Chief of Army Staff. Strangely for a man who disliked
military coups and military governments, he served as a member of
firstly Major-General Buhari’s Supreme Military Council from 1984-85,
and in Ibrahim Babangida’s Armed Forces Ruling Council thereafter.
Prior
to the coup Nzeogwu gave other cryptic clues about his intentions. On
one occasion while discussing Brigadier Ademulegun, Nzeogwu told Major
Alex Madiebo to “go easy with the Brigadier, for when the strong wind blows, all the grass bends low to allow it to pass”. Madiebo did not immediately appreciate the significance of what Nzeogwu had said to him, but on January 15th 1966, Nzeogwu’s made his intentions explicitly clear.
Major
Emmanuel Ifeajuna was an Igbo from Onitsha and the Brigade Major in
Lagos. He was an international athlete of some repute and held the
Commonwealth record for high jumping. He was also a graduate of the
University of Ibadan (where he had subversive tendencies). Ifeajuna was
the “brains” behind the coup and wrote a manuscript on the reasons why
he felt a military coup was necessary. This manuscript has never been
published.
THE “FIVE MAJORS”?
One
enduring myth is that Nigeria’s first military coup was carried out by
“five Igbo Majors”. The source of this myth is the “we were five in
number” comment, which the coup’s most visible, participant: Major
Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu, made in an interview with Dennis Ejindu (Africa and the world - May 1967)
after the coup. The “five Majors” myth was later perpetuated by
Captain Ben Gbulie’s book on the coup entitled “Nigeria’s Five Majors”,
the title of which he has admitted borrowing from a BBC play of the same
name.
When Nzeogwu made his infamous “we were five in number” comment, he made no reference to the rank
of the “five”. He was merely referring to the five designated
strategic regional commanders of the coup. In fact, no less than nine
Majors were originally billed to take part in the coup. These nine were
Majors Nzeogwu, Ifeajuna, Ademoyega, Okafor, Anuforo, Chukwuka, Obienu,
Onwuatuegwu and Chude-Sokei. Shortly before the coup, Chude-Sokei was
posted overseas. On the coup day itself, Obienu failed to show,
leaving seven Majors as participants. When it came to execution, the
Majors designated five officers as regional commanders for the coup’s
execution. Of Nzeogwu’s “five”, there were “the two of us in the North”
(Nzeogwu and Major Tim Onwuatuegwu), and three more in the South.
The head of the Lagos operations was Major Emmanuel Ifeajuna. That makes three Majors
so far. The squad, which killed Chief Samuel Akintola in Ibadan, was
led by CAPTAIN Nwobosi. That makes four (three Majors and one
Captain). There was no coup in the Mid-West as no military formation was
based in that Region. However, Lieutenant Oguchi was dispatched to the
east to arrest the Premier of the Eastern region: Dr Michael Okpara.
The identity of the fifth member is the most problematic. Majors Don
Okafor and Adewale Ademoyega were given much responsibility for the
Lagos branch of the coup, and it is likely that one of these two men was
the fifth commander.
WHO WAS THE LEADER?
Major
Nzeogwu has since 1966, been touted as the leader of the January 1966
coup. This has been widely presumed due to the visible role which
Nzeogwu played during and after the coup. Nzeogwu was the only Major to
successfully execute the coup in his designated target region. He
then followed up his coup success with his infamous “our enemies are
the…..” speech. Thus the (false) assumption that he was the coup
leader spread. The truth may be somewhat different. It was not until
the coup plot reached its logistical stage that Nzeogwu was brought in
to the conspiratorial group. The brains behind the coup was probably
Major Emmanuel Ifeajuna, however Ifeajuna was chased out of Nigeria’s
then capital city of Lagos by Major-General Ironsi. Realising that
Ironsi was rounding up those that took part in the coup, Ifeajuna fled
to Ghana, leaving Nzeogwu to hold the fort.
***
In part two I shall describe the execution of the coup itself.
